As noted by Samuelson in his introduction of the Strong Independence axiom, essentially the same set of axioms rationalize an Expected Utility representation of preferences over lotteries with (i) a scalar payo¤ such as money and (ii) vector payo¤s such as quantities of di¤erent commodities. Assume a two-good setting, where an individual's preferences satisfy the Strong Independence axiom for lotteries paying o¤ quantities of each good separately. This paper identi…es the incremental axioms required for the preference relation over lotteries paying o¤ the vector of goods to also satisfy the Strong Independence axiom. The key element of this extension is a Coherence axiom which requires a particular "meshing together" of certainty preferences over commodity bundles and preferences over non-degenerate lotteries for individual goods. The Coherence axiom is shown to have interesting theoretical implications for Allais paradox-like behavior when confronting lotteries over multiple goods.
Introduction
It is well known that essentially the same set of axioms rationalize an Expected Utility representation of preferences over lotteries with (i) a scalar payo¤ such as money and (ii) vector payo¤s such as quantities of di¤erent commodities. This parallel was …rst noted in Samuelson (1952) which appeared in a collection of papers in Econometrica discussing the introduction of Samuelson's Strong Independence axiom. 1 The speci…c context of the multivariate application was an example due to Wold (in Wold, Shackle and Savage 1952) of lottery tickets which give the holder (weekly) quantities of milk and wine consumption. Today more than sixty years later, multivariate applications of Expected Utility in Economics are widespread.
In this paper, I derive the additional axioms which are necessary and su¢ cient to go from Strong Independence holding on lotteries involving single goods, such as wine or milk, to lotteries paying o¤ multiple goods. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that there are only two goods. Given the consistent evidence from a large number of laboratory tests over many years challenging the univariate Strong Independence axiom, it would seem quite important in assessing the behavior of individuals when facing multivariate lotteries to di¤erentiate between violations of Strong Independence for individual goods and violations of the incremental axioms. It might, for instance, be the case that the incremental axioms are consistent with laboratory tests and could play a useful role in extending univariate non-Expected Utility to multivariate settings.
One important special case of extending univariate Expected Utility to bivariate choice problems is addressed by Rossman and Selden (1978) , where preferences are de…ned over certain …rst period consumption and random second period consumption. In their setting because the choice space is not a mixture space, the standard multivariate Expected Utility axioms could not be applied. However in this paper, the quantities of both goods are random and the space of joint distribution functions (corresponding to the set of lotteries) is a mixture space. It is assumed that the risk preferences for each of the two goods conditional on certain quantities of the other good satisfy the Strong Independence axiom. While this is necessary for preferences over lotteries paying o¤ both goods to satisfy the Strong Independence axiom, it is not su¢ cient. One must add a "Coherence" I thank Minwook Kang and Xiao Wei for many insightful comments and suggestions and the Sol Snider Research Center -Wharton for support.
1 Samuelson (1952) notes that in the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) treatment of behavior under uncertainty, no explicit axiom corresponds to his Strong Independence axiom (also see Malinvaud 1952) . The …rst version of this axiom was introduced in Samuelson (1950) . Figure 1 . Let c 1 and c 2 correspond to quantities of two commodities such as wine and milk and denote by x 0 , x 00 , x 000 and x 0000 di¤erent quantities of the …rst good and y 0 , y 00 , y 000 and y 0000 di¤erent quantities of the second good. Assume lottery L 1 with payo¤s of (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x 0000 ; y 0000 ) and lottery L 2 with payo¤s (x 000 ; y 000 ) and (x 00 ; y 00 ). Coherence requires that if the certain pairs (x 0 ; y 0 )
and (x 000 ; y 000 ) are indi¤erent and (x 00 ; y 00 ) and (x 0000 ; y 0000 ) are also indi¤erent and the payo¤s of lotteries L 1 and L 2 have the same probabilities, then L 1 and L 2 must be indi¤erent. If Coherence holds, then both lotteries are indi¤erent to the same new lottery on a common vertical such as the one passing through the …xed value x 00 of good one in Figure 1 (b) . This new lottery L 3 has payo¤s for the second good of y 00 and y 00000 . If risk preferences for lotteries on the vertical conditional on the quantity x 00 of the …rst good satisfy the classic univariate Expected Utility axioms, then the initial pair of lotteries L 1 and L 2 can be thought of as having their payo¤s shifted along the certainty indi¤erence curves and then compared using the Expected Utility function conditional on x 00 . Given that this process of transferring lotteries to a common vertical involves using certainty indi¤erence curves, the Coherence axiom can be viewed as requiring a "meshing together" of preferences over risky lotteries on a single vertical, such as L 3 in Figure 1 (b), and preferences over certain consumption pairs. The key for the above transfer process to work is that the payo¤s of each lottery being compared must lie on a certainty indi¤erence curve that intersects the x 00 -vertical. However suppose one assumes the classic CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function characterized by an indi¤erence curve asymptotic to the x 00 -vertical as in Figure 2 . 3 Then it is possible that a set of indi¤erence curves in the unshaded region never intersect the vertical corresponding to x 00 . In this case, a comparison of lotteries with payo¤s in the unshaded and shaded regions of Figure 2 would not seem possible. However suppose preferences over lotteries for one good conditional on every certain quantity of the other good satisfy the Strong Independence axiom and Coherence holds. Then it is possible to "knit" together the various regions of the consumption space where Strong Independence holds locally and show that Strong Independence holds for the full space of lotteries paying o¤ both goods. Although Samuelson blew "hot and cold"on the reasonableness of the Strong Independence axiom, he ended up arguing for "independence" based on the fact that lottery tickets must come up "heads or tails"-if one side of the coin comes up, the other cannot. He reasoned that if two lottery tickets, or probability distributions, are indi¤erent, there is no reason why the combination of the …rst with a third distribution should contaminate the choice of the second with the same third ticket. Some will no doubt similarly …nd the Coherence axiom to have an intuitive a multivariate setting where the Expected Utility axioms hold, the resulting NM (von NeumannMorgenstern) index will be a monotonic transform of the representation of certainty preferences. The Coherence axiom is required for the two-argument cardinal utility of the Expected Utility representation and the certainty utility to be ordinally equivalent. 3 The CES utility function assumed in Figure 2 is U (c 1 ; c 2 ) = appeal. However suppose an individual's preferences over lotteries on one good conditional on a single value of a second good exhibit Allais paradox-like behavior (Allais 1953 (Allais , 2008 . Then acceptance of the Coherence axiom implies that the individual will also exhibit Allais paradox-like behavior for a speci…c set of lottery tickets corresponding to every other value of the certain good. Moreover, the individual will also exhibit this behavior for a set of lotteries paying o¤ di¤erent quantities of both goods. Several examples are provided illustrating that some but not all of the lotteries implied by Coherence have a similar intuitive appeal as the original Allais set of lotteries. These very simple examples seem to reinforce the point raised above concerning the potential importance of pursuing laboratory tests of both Coherence and univariate Strong Independence. It is interesting to observe that despite the vast literature covering conceptual discussions and laboratory tests associated with the original Allais example, 4 no comparable analysis of choices over lottery tickets with vector payo¤s seems to have been undertaken. In the next section I introduce notation and a formal de…nition of Coherence. Several examples are introduced to illustrate some of the issues in extending the Strong Independence axiom from a single good to multiple goods. In Section 3, the Coherence axiom is shown to be necessary and su¢ cient to extend an Expected Utility function de…ned over lotteries for a single good to a bivariate Expected Utility representation of preferences over the full space of lottery tickets for both goods. Section 4 discusses when an Expected Utility representation in a region of the choice space can be extended to the full space. Section 5 considers the implications of Coherence given the existence of Allais paradox behavior. The last section o¤ers concluding comments.
Coherence

Preliminaries
Let c 1 2 C 1 and c 2 2 C 2 denote the quantities of two commodities, where unless stated otherwise C 1 = C 2 = (0; 1). De…ne C = C 1 C 2 . It will prove useful to introduce the subsets C[x] = def fxg C 2 where x 2 C 1 and C[y] = def C 1 fyg where y 2 C 2 (see Figure 3) . C[x] and C[y], respectively, will be referred to as a "vertical" and "horizontal" in the commodity space C. Let F 1 denote the set of c.d.f.s (cumulative distribution functions) de…ned on C 1 and F 1 be an element in F 1 . Similarly, F 2 is the set of c.d.f.s on C 2 and F 2 is an element in F 2 . The distributions can be viewed as corresponding to lotteries paying o¤ di¤erent consumption quantities. The degenerate or one point c.d.f. with saltus or jump point at c 1 2 C 1 is denoted F 1 (c 1 ) 2 F 1 and similarly for F 2 (c 2 ) 2 F 2 . Finally let J denote the set of joint cumulative distribution functions de…ned on C 1 C 2 and J is an element in J . Let J (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 J be a degenerate joint distribution with saltus point at (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 C.
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I consider the following three types of preference structures: 6 1. Certainty preferences over consumption pairs in C 1 C 2 described by the binary relation C ;
2. Conditional risk preferences (i) over F 2 and conditioned on each quantity x 2 C 1 described by the set of binary relations f F 2
x j x 2 C 1 g and (ii) over F 1 and conditioned on each quantity y 2 C 2 of the second good described by the set of binary relations f F 1 y j y 2 C 2 g; and 5 It should be stressed that in this paper, the setting is static. The stochastic structure is very di¤erent from the intertemporal (consumption tree) case where the consumer faces random quantities of consumption in two future time periods and the uncertainty is resolved sequentially with the possibility of making choices after the resolution of the …rst period's outcome. 6 As is standard in the axiomatic treatment of the Expected Utility hypothesis (see, for example, Machina 2008 and Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995) , preferences are de…ned over alternative possible outcomes or lotteries over these outcomes. In my analysis, as in Samuelson (1952) , the outcomes of the lotteries are units of commodity bundles of the form (c 1 ; c 2 ). Since the focus of this paper is on the standard representation results, the important distinction between consumption and change in consumption is ignored. For a discussion of the important calibration issues associated with Expected Utility functions de…ned on absolute consumption or wealth levels and for a simple model for addressing these problems see Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999) . 3. Bivariate preferences over joint distributions in J described by the binary relation J :
It should be stressed that each conditional preference relation can only be used to compare lotteries paying o¤ di¤erent quantities of one good with the quantity of the other good being …xed. For instance, they do not describe choices such as between (x 0 ; F 2 ) and (x 00 ; G 2 ) where x 0 ; x 00 2 C 1 , x 0 6 = x 00 and F 2 ; G 2 2 F 2 .
It will also be useful to de…ne the set of certain consumption pairs which are indi¤erent to some pair on a given vertical or horizontal
and
In Figure 4 , which assumes the same CES utility as in Figure 2 , the subset C fxg of C corresponds to the shaded area below a boundary indi¤erence curve which is asymptotic to the vertical C [x] . Every point in the shaded area lies on some indi¤erence curve intersecting C[x] and every point northeast of the boundary indi¤erence curve lies on a curve not intersecting the vertical. (See Figure 7 and the related discussion in Subsection 3.1 for the more general case.) It will prove convenient to denote the support of J as supp J and de…ne the following subsets of
; where x 2 C 1 g ;
where y 2 C 2 g ;
and Sfyg = def fJ 2 J j supp J C fyg ; where y 2 C 2 g :
In terms of Figure 3 , the set S[x] includes each joint distribution function characterized by each of its saltus points lying on the vertical C [x] . The set of joint distribution functions Sfxg can be illustrated in terms of Figure 4 , where any c.d.f. in Sfxg is characterized by its support lying in the shaded region C fxg. Throughout, the following are assumed to hold.
Assumption 1
The set of joint cumulative distribution functions J corresponds to some (topological) subspace of the space of all (countably additive) joint probability measures M (C 1 C 2 ), 7 which is endowed with the topology of weak convergence. The set of one-point joint c.d.f.s (supported by the domain of J ), J , is a subset of J .
Assumption 2 There exists a complete preference preordering on J , J .
Assumption 3
J is representable by a continuous "Bernoulli index" : J ! R.
8;9
Assumption 4 8c; c
clearly a metric space and B(C 1 C 2 ) is its Borel -…eld.
8 I follow Grandmont (1972) in using the term "Bernoulli index" to refer to any real-valued order-preserving representation . If this representation takes the very special Expected Utility form, I refer to the utility de…ned on the commodities as the NM index. It should be noted that Machina (2008) uses similar terminology referring to the representations on distributions as and the utility de…ned on payo¤s as the NM utility. When discussing only Expected Utility preferences, it is more common to refer to the utility de…ned on distributions as the NM utility and refer to the utility de…ned on the payo¤s as the Bernoulli utility (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995) . 9 Instead of assuming , one could prove its existence by placing topological restrictions on J and conditions on J following Theorem 1 in Grandmont (1972) .
Given Assumption 4, de…ne the natural embedding :
where J (c 1 ; c 2 ) has a saltus point at (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 C. With the above assumptions, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Assumptions 1-5 hold. The certainty preferences C over C 1 C 2 can be represented by a continuous, strictly increasing ordinal index U :
Proof. De…ning
it can be seen that U :
2 ). Next we argue that U is continuous. Note that U = will be continuous if and are. Since is continuous, we need only establish the continuity of . But given that J is endowed with the weak topology, it is clear that will be continuous. Finally, Assumption 5 clearly implies that U is strictly increasing in each of its argument.
Following Samuelson (1952) , the univariate Strong Independence axiom is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1 For a given x 2 C 1 , the conditional risk preference relation
satis…es the Strong Independence axiom i¤ 8F 2 ; G 2 ; H 2 ; I 2 2 F 2 and 8 2 [0; 1]
Then we can make the following assumption.
Assumption 6 For a given x 2 C 1 , the conditional risk preference relation
satis…es the Strong Independence axiom.
It should be noted that Assumption 6 imposes no restrictions on the relationship between the elements of f x g or of fV x g. The Lemma below directly follows from Grandmont (1972) .
Lemma 2 Assumptions 1-6 hold. For a given x 2 C 1 , the conditional risk preferences 
While De…nition 1, Assumption 6 and Lemma 2 are based on lotteries with payo¤s on a given vertical C[x], analogous statements can be made for lotteries with payo¤s on a horizontal C[y].
Finally, I de…ne the bivariate Strong Independence axiom on all of J .
Since each lottery corresponds to a joint probability measure which is equivalent to a joint c.d.f., for notational simplicity lotteries will be referred to as elements in J .
Following from Grandmont (1972) , we have Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Assumptions 1-5 hold and J satis…es the Strong Independence axiom.
Then J is representable according to the Expected Utility principle where W :
It should be stressed that rather than assuming Strong Independence holds on all of J , I seek to identify what in addition to Assumptions 1-5 and the Strong Independence Assumption 6 is necessary and su¢ cient for Strong Independence to hold on all of J and for J to be representable by an Expected Utility function as in Lemma 3.
Motivating Example
Consider the following simple example which illustrates that assuming Strong Independence holds for lotteries with payo¤s on each vertical and on each horizontal does not guarantee that Strong Independence holds for lotteries with payo¤s corresponding to c.d.f.s in all of J .
Example 1 Assume the bivariate preferences J are represented by
where
2) 12 and F 1 and F 2 are de…ned respectively by
In this case, J induces the certainty preference relation C which is representable by the strictly quasiconcave utility
It can be easily veri…ed that 8x 2
and similarly, 8y 2 C 2 , if J 2 S[y],
Thus, (J) takes the Expected Utility form for any lottery with
However to see that the representation in (13) does not in general satisfy Strong Independence over J assume that
Consider the following two lotteries L 1 =< (1; 1); (4; 1=4); 50%; 50% > and L 2 =< (1; 64=25); (9=4; 1=25); 50%; 50% >. Since 
implying that 0:5L 1 + 0:5L 3 J 0:5L 2 + 0:5L 3 and hence the Strong Independence axiom does not hold over all of J .
Remark 1 It is natural to wonder whether the utility function (13) satis…es …rst order stochastic dominance. It follows from Crawford (2005) that bivariate …rst order stochastic dominance implies …rst order dominance in the marginal distributions, i.e.,
and 8y 2 C 2 ,
implying that (J 1 ) (J 2 ) in Example 1. Therefore, the utility function (13) satis…es …rst order stochastic dominance. 
Transfer Maps
Before formally de…ning the Coherence axiom, it will prove useful to introduce the notion of a transfer map. Assume without loss of generality one confronts a lottery with the payo¤s (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x 00 ; y 00 ) as in Figure 5 , where the associated joint distribution is denoted by J. 14 Further suppose that conditional risk preferences are de…ned on the vertical C[x] and both payo¤s are in Cfxg. De…ne the vertical
which maps the two points (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x 00 ; y 00 ) respectively into (x; y 000 ) and (x; y 0000 )
on the same vertical C[x] by the "sliding the points along the certainty indi¤erence curves". 15 De…ne the vertical "induced" transfer x : Sfxg ! S[x] which is also given by (28) (the same symbol is used for both mappings). A new certain quantity of the …rst good and c.d.f. for the second good (x; F 2 ) 2 fxg F 2 is obtained by (1) …nding the two jump points f(x; y 000 ); (x; y 0000 )g on C[x] by applying the the transfer x to (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x 00 ; y 00 ) where (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x; y 000 ) lie on the same indi¤erence curve and (x 00 ; y 00 ) and (x; y 0000 ) lie on the same indi¤erence curve and (2) assuming the same "probability structure" as J, i.e., J(x 0 ; y 0 ) = F 2 (y 000 ) and J(x 00 ; y 00 ) = F 2 (y 0000 ).
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De…nition 3 (Vertical Induced Transfer Mapping) The vertical transfer mapping
is characterized by the relation c s Whereas the induced transfer de…ned in De…nition 3 always maps a lottery into a speci…c vertical, it is also possible to de…ne a map which transfers any joint distribution to distributions on a set of "diagonal" linear rays which are neither vertical nor horizontal.
Suppose that the Strong Independence axiom holds for all lotteries on diagonal rays and on all verticals and horizontals, is this su¢ cient for Strong Independence to hold on all of J ? A concrete example is provided next which demonstrates that this is not the case. First it will prove convenient to give the following de…nitions. For any a; b 2 R,
14 This discussion can readily be extended to lotteries with more than two payo¤s. 15 The analysis of a transfer map for the case of the horizontal C[y] is analogous to that of the
. Since discussing them simultaneously is notationally cumbersome, throughout the rest of the paper only the vertical case is considered. 16 The vertical induced transfer map eqn. (28) generalizes the map Rossman and Selden (1978) , where the latter requires that the support of the distribution before the transfer be in the single vertical C[x 0 ] for the …xed x 0 . 
Example 2 Assume the bivariate preferences J are represented by
which will be recognized to be a special case of the representation (13) in Example 1. J induces the certainty preference relation C which is representable by
which is ordinally equivalent to
and similarly 8y 2 C 2 , if J 2 S[y], 
Thus for any J in S[x] or S[y], (J) takes the Expected Utility form and hence for both cases the univariate Strong Independence axiom holds. Conditional on all rays going through the origin, i.e., J 2 S[x = ay] (a > 0), (see Figure 6) we have
which is also an Expected Utility representation and hence the Strong Independence axiom holds. Thus in terms of Figure 6 , the relative preference for the two lotteries < (x 0 ; y 0 ); (x 000 ; y 000 ); ; 1 > and < (x 00 ; y 00 ); (x 0000 ; y 0000 ); ; 1 > on the di¤erent diagonals can be evaluated using the Expected Utility (37). However, since (31) is a special case of the utility in Example 1, the Strong Independence axiom does not hold over all of J .
Coherence Axiom
From Example 2, it is apparent that the Strong Independence axiom holding for each vertical, horizontal and set of rays through the origin is not enough to ensure that it holds for all of J . To extend the Strong Independence axiom, the following Coherence property, which is based on utilizing the vertical induced transfer map x , is key.
Assumption 7 For a given x 2 C 1 , the preference relation J exhibits Coherence over S fxg.
Remark 2 When Coherence holds, the vertical induced transfer map x can be given an interesting compensation interpretation. Consider the case in Figure 5 . Using certainty preferences C , the change in the consumption values for the …rst good from x 0 to x and x 00 to x is exactly compensated by adjusting the consumption levels of the second good from y 0 to y 000 and y 00 to y 0000 , where the probability structure is held …xed. In this process the joint distribution is deformed into a pair comprised of certain consumption for one good and a univariate distribution for the second good, (x; F 2 ). Notice that since x J is already on the x-vertical, applying x ( x J) will not a¤ect it. Hence
and thus it can be easily seen that Coherence is equivalent to the following invariance property J s
which is consistent with the geometry in Figure 5 where the lotteries < (x 0 ; y 0 ) ; (x 00 ; y 00 ) ;
; 1 > and < (x; y 000 ) ; (x; y 0000 ) ; ; 1 > are indi¤erent.
Bivariate Expected Utility
In this section assuming an individual satis…es the Strong Independence axiom for lotteries over one good, I identify the additional axiom structure which is both necessary and su¢ cient for the Strong Independence axiom to hold for lotteries over two goods and for the existence of an Expected Utility representation of preferences over the full space of joint distributions J .
Strong Independence Axiom on S fxg
As I next show, the Coherence axiom and the Strong Independence axiom holding on fxg F 2 together are equivalent to the Strong Independence axiom holding over the subspace Sfxg.
Theorem 1 Assumptions 1-5 hold. The Strong Independence axiom is satis…ed over Sfxg for a given x 2 C 1 i¤ Assumptions 6 and 7 are satis…ed.
Without loss of generality, consider a two state lottery. Assume the …rst state payo¤ is denoted by c (1) 2 C 1 C 2 and has probability = . The second state payo¤ is c (2) 2 C 1 C 2 with the probability = 1 . If we use J 1 to denote the degenerate c.d.f. with the saltus point at c
(1) and J 2 to denote the degenerate c.d.f. with the saltus point at c (2) , then
Remark 3 Comparing De…nitions 2 and 4, it is important to observe that for lotteries in Sfxg the Coherence axiom follows from an application of the Strong Independence axiom to pairs of indi¤erent degenerate lotteries not necessarily de…ned on the same vertical and use of the natural embedding mapping (7). This relationship is used in the necessity proof of Theorem 1. However, as Example 1 demonstrates, Coherence is not implied by the Strong Independence axiom holding on each vertical (Assumption 6) since this imposes no restriction on the certainty preferences C . Thus Coherence as de…ned, can be applied to settings where one or both goods in the lottery are random.
Given that Coherence enables the Strong Independence on a given vertical C[x] to be inherited on Sfxg, will this be true as well for the full space of joint distributions J ? Depending on the form of the certainty U , Cfxg can take one of the four possible forms in Figure 7 .
17 It can be seen that for the class of utility functions corresponding to Figure 7 (a), Cfxg = C and hence Sfxg = J . For the other cases in Figure 7 , it is clear that one cannot apply the transfer map to points in the unshaded regions. Thus it would seem that Coherence cannot be used to ensure that Strong Independence holds for c.d.f.s outside the subset Sfxg of J .
Expected Utility Representation Theorem on J
In this subsection, I show what additional axiom structure is required to overcome the limitation of Theorem 1 only holding for Sfxg and provide the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an Expected Utility representation for
as introduced in Lemma 3. Consider the following modi…cations of Assumptions 6 and 7.
Assumption 6 0 For each x 2 C 1 , the conditional risk preference relation
Assumption 7 0 For each x 2 C 1 , the preference relation J exhibits Coherence over S fxg.
Theorem 2 Assumptions 1-5 together with Assumptions 6 0 and 7 0 are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of a real-valued continuous, strictly increasing NM 17 See Rossman and Selden (1978) . Proof. Necessity is obvious. We only need to prove su¢ ciency. The outline of the proof is as follow. First based on Theorem 1, we know that one can extend Strong Independence on a given x-vertical to the subspace Sfxg. Then we will argue that there exists a series of x-values such that the union of Sfxg can cover the whole space J (This is be shown in Lemma 4 below). Using the uniqueness of the Bernoulli index , we can merge the representation on each subspace Sfxg to obtain an Expected Utility form. The distributions considered here are more general than those in the proof of Theorem 3 in Rossman and Selden (1978) . As a result, a number technical issues related to merging di¤erent representations must be addressed. First, the following will be used to de…ne a sequence of subsets of C which can be used to spread the representation de…ned on Sfxg to all of J .
Lemma 4 (Rossman and Selden 1978, Lemma 3)
There is a subset fx n j n = 0; 1; 2; :::g of C 1 , such that (i) Cfx n g \ Cfx n+1 g 6 = ? for each n, (ii) x n < x n+1 for each n and (iii) [ n Cfx n g = C.
Following this Lemma we only need to prove that for N = 0; 1; 2; ::: there is an a¢ ne index N , which is a¢ ne in the probabilities, representing J over 19 Although for simplicity a …nite state lottery is assumed here, this assumption is not essential.
For lotteries with in…nite number of states, one can adjust the probability function similarly. 
then we obtain two new lotteries J V and J Z , where J V has V states with the adjusted probability 0 v and J Z has Z states with the adjusted probability 0 z . Consequently, N +1 may be de…ned by
The intuition for why we de…ne N +1 (J) in this way can be illustrated as follows. For simplicity, consider a two-state lottery < (c 1 ; c 2 ) ; (c 
Combining the above two equations with eqn. (52) yields
Now we have proved that
. To show point (2), we use the classical uniqueness result once again to show that N +1 coincides with an a¢ ne transform over Sfxg for every x such that Sfxg S (K [ L). First, note that there is some a¢ ne index ' over Sfxg (8x 2 C 1 ). But then ' and N +1 give a¢ ne indices over Sfxg \ S (K). So
where 1 is an arbitrary a¢ ne transform. Similarly, we have
where 2 is an arbitrary a¢ ne transform. Consequently,
21 Rossman and Selden (1978) 
when proving their Lemma 5 (Rossman and Selden 1978, p. 82) . This is appropriate in their setting where one good is certain since if J 2 S (K [ L) and J = 2 S (K), then J 2 S (L) and hence N +1 is de…ned for all the possible distributions over K [ L. However in the current setting where both goods are random, if a lottery has two states corresponding to the two points in Figure 8 
To solve this problem, we de…ne N +1 in another way as in eqn. (54). When J 2 S (K) or J 2 S (L), it is easy to see that the two de…nitions converge.
Since Sfxg \ S (K \ L) contains at least two elements which are not indi¤erent, the a¢ ne transforms 1 and 2 must be identical, i.e., = 1 = 2 . Therefore,
implying that N +1 j Sfxg = '. Since both and ' are a¢ ne, N +1 must also be a¢ ne in S (K [ L) .
The intuition for Theorem 2 can be explained very simply in terms of Figure  8 or Sfx 0 g \ Sfx 00 g 6 = ?, due to the uniqueness of the representation de…ned on the intersection region Sfx 0 g \ Sfx 00 g, we can conclude that the NM indices W x 0 and W x 00 must be a¢ nely equivalent. In other words, there exists a unique W for Cfx 0 g [ Cfx 00 g. Since we can …nd a series of x such that C = [Cfxg, by induction, we will have a unique (up to an a¢ ne transformation) NM index W such that R R C W (c 1 ; c 2 )dJ(c 1 ; c 2 ) represents the preference relation J over the whole space J .
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Given Theorem 2, we immediately have the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Let Assumptions 1-5 hold. Then the Strong Independence axiom is satis…ed on all of J i¤ Assumptions 6 0 and 7 0 are satis…ed.
22 Although Example 1 satis…es Assumption 6 0 , it violates Assumption 7 0 and hence J is not representable by an Expected Utility in general. The fact that Assumption 7 0 is violated can be seen as follows. Assume that the certain pairs (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x 00 ; y 00 ) are indi¤erent as are the pairs (x 0 ; y 000 ) and (x 00 ; y 0000 ), i.e., given the representation U de…ned by (16)
It follows that if Assumption 7 0 holds, the pairs L 1 =< (x 0 ; y 0 ) ; (x 0 ; y 000 ) ; ; 1 > and L 2 =< (x 0 ; y 0 ) ; (x 00 ; y 0000 ) ; ; 1 > must be indi¤erent. However, it can be easily veri…ed that
Since (L 1 ) 6 = (L 2 ), Assumption 7 0 does not hold.
As discussed above, Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 together can only guarantee an Expected Utility representation on Sfxg. However, if Sfxg = J for a given x, then Theorem 2 can be weakened by replacing Assumption 6 0 by the simpler requirement that the conditional risk preference relation
x satis…es the Strong Independence axiom for the corresponding x (Assumption 6). For the case in Figure 7 (a), any x 2 C 1 can be chosen.
Local Expected Utility
In Example 1, it was demonstrated that although preferences satisfy the Expected Utility hypothesis locally over the subsets
, this provides no guarantee that there exists an Expected Utility representation over the rest of the space of joint distributions J o , where
However as the following 
Then J induces the certainty preference relation C which is representable by U (c 1 ; c 2 ) which up to a monotone transformation is equivalent to W (c 1 ; c 2 ). When
and when J 2 [ y S[y],
where F 1 and F 2 are de…ned respectively by (14) and (15).
23
23 It should be noted that from the continuity of , it follows that the NM indices in (64), (65) and (66) must be identical.
Proof. First given Assumption 1 that J corresponds to the space of probability measures M that is endowed with the weak convergent topology, 8J 2 [ x S[x], it always possible to …nd a set of joint distributions J i (i = 1; 2; :::) in J o that weakly converge to J. Since J i 2 J o ,
Due to the continuity of and the de…nition of weak convergence, one must have
(68) The case when J 2 [ y S[y] can be discussed similarly.
The critical role played by the continuity assumption of in Theorem 3 is illustrated by the following example. The assumed form of utility can be viewed as a type of bivariate extension of the u V non-Expected Utility preference model introduced by Schmidt (1998) and further analyzed in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) . 24 Without continuity, the assumption that preferences on J o are representable by an Expected Utility function does not imply the same for preferences on verticals and horizontals.
Example 3 Assume bivariate preferences, J are represented by
where J induces the certainty preference relation C which is representable by U (c 1 ; c 2 ). Clearly, the representation (69) 24 Schmidt (1998) created this speci…c preference model to facilitate measuring the certainty e¤ect associated with the widely documented laboratory violations of Expected Utility preferences. This u V model is based on an axiom system involving choices over univariate lotteries where the utility u is used to evaluate choices involving degenerate lotteries (associated with certain outcomes) and V is the NM index of an Expected Utility representation used to evaluate non-degenerate lotteries. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) conducted lab tests and found that "Expected Utility performs well away from certainty, but fails primarily near certainty", which is consistent with the u V model. However it should be noted that if u and V are not ordinally equivalent to each other, Schmidt's u V model is not continuous.
will be continuous only if the indices W (c 1 ; c 2 ), U (c 1 ; c 2 ), V
(1)
and similarly, 8y 2 C 2 , if J 2 S[y], then
If U , V
c 2 and V
c 1 are not ordinally equivalent, then (71) and (72) 
Allais Paradox
As mentioned in Section 1, despite the intuitive appeal of Samuelson's (Samuelson 1952 ) mutually exclusive argument for the univariate Strong Independence axiom, there is extensive laboratory evidence over many years of violations of the axiom. Many of these experiments replicate versions of the famous Allais Paradox (Allais 1953 and . Since the Coherence axiom is essential to the bivariate form of Strong Independence holding but at the same time is a totally independent axiom, it is natural to wonder whether a persuasive case can be made for Coherence. Absent direct laboratory tests on this axiom, the following two examples suggest that the case for Coherence may be less than fully compelling.
Example 4 Let c 1 and c 2 denote lottery payo¤s in periods one and two, respectively. For simplicity, assume linear certainty indi¤erence curves corresponding to U (c 1 ; c 2 ) = c 1 + c 2 (73) 25 The speci…c forms of in (71) and (72) will be recognized to be OCE (Ordinal Certainty Equivalent) representations introduced in Selden (1978). with no discounting. Consider the following set of lotteries which pay o¤ both a …xed certain dollar value of period one generalized consumption, c 1 = 3 million dollars, and a distribution of dollar values of period two consumption c 2 (for both this example and the next one, the units are in millions of dollars).
L 2 : < (3; 1) ; (3; 5) ; (3; 0) ; 89%; 10%; 1% >; (75)
and L 4 : < (3; 5) ; (3; 0) ; 10%; 90% > :
Each lottery can be viewed as being de…ned on the x-vertical, where x = 3. The lottery payo¤s are not part of an optimization problem and must be consumed.
They cannot be shifted between periods. 26 The pattern of c 2 -payo¤s will be recognized to mimic the distributions in the classic univariate Allais Paradox. As a result, it is natural to expect that many individuals based on J will prefer L 1 to L 2 and L 4 to L 3 , whereas bivariate Expected Utility preferences would require that L 3 is preferred to L 4 . 27;28 In order to investigate the implications of the Coherence axiom holding, consider the transfer map (28) corresponding to (73) given by
where ( 
and L 0 4 :< (x 0 ; xx 0 (5)) ; (x 0 ; xx 0 (0)) ; 10%; 90% > :
26 Alternatively, one could think of c 1 and c 2 as corresponding to non-tradeable dollar values of permanent housing services and vacation housing services. 27 For the classic univariate argument, see Mas-Colell, Whiston and Green (1995) . 28 There is no reason to suppose a priori that the common …xed payment of $3 million for c 1 would reduce the distaste for the c 2 -payo¤ of $0 frequently exhibited in univariate laboratory tests. Indeed for di¤erent certainty representations corresponding to U , the c 2 -payo¤ of $0 might be viewed as being even more unacceptable. Of course, these observations invite direct laboratory tests. The next example considers the implications of Coherence for lotteries where the transferred payo¤s are on the 45 ray rather than a vertical.
Example 5 The same assumptions and notation are employed as in Example 4. Consider the following set of lotteries which pay o¤ both a …xed certain dollar value of period one generalized consumption, c 1 = 2 million dollars, and a distribution of dollar values of period two consumption which again mimics the Allais paradox distributions L 1 : < (2; 1); 100% >; (87) L 2 : < (2; 1) ; (2; 5) ; (2; 0) ; 89%; 10%; 1% >; 
Again it is natural, based on J , that L 1 will be preferred to L 2 and L 4 will be preferred to L 3 , whereas Expected Utility preferences would require that L 3 is preferred to L 4 . Transferring the above lotteries along the certainty indi¤erence curve to the 45 ray yields 
Conclusion
For preferences over lotteries paying o¤ two goods, the classic Strong Independence axiom has been shown roughly speaking to be equivalent to Strong Independence holding for one good and bivariate preferences satisfying a Coherence axiom. Examples 3 -5 suggest several avenues for potentially interesting future research. First, given the extensive evidence from laboratory experiments challenging the predictive ability of assuming that univariate preferences satisfy Strong Independence, a number of alternative preference models not requiring this axiom have been developed and tested against the Expected Utility benchmark. Most of this work has assumed univariate preferences. Following the results in Example 3 which focuses on a bivariate extension of the u V non-Expected Utility model, it is natural to ask whether Coherence can be used to extend other non-Expected Utility models to multivariate settings and to investigate what implications this might have for the properties of the overall ordering. Second, Examples 4 and 5 suggest that the Coherence axiom might result in a spreading of localized violations of univariate preference axioms to larger regions of the choice space. It would seem to be of considerable interest to examine both the related theoretical issues as well as the predictive ability of the Coherence axiom in standard laboratory experiments.
